Overthrow

A limited and misleading look at the fall of Salvador Allende.

The past month marked the 51st anniversary of the death of Salvador Allende, as well as the collapse of his regime in Chile in 1973. Often heralded as being a hero to the international left, Allende has had no shortage of admirers who seek to defend and distort his record. In 2006, author and journalist Stephen Kinzer published his book Overthrow. The book discussed the role that the United States would play in the process of enacting regime change against countries such as Iran, Cuba, Hawaii, Guatemala, Panama, Chile, and others. While the book mainly covered the American side of these events, Kinzer’s one sided history lessons left a lot of information out that otherwise would have hindered some of his more outlandish claims. In particular, in his chapter on the events that took place in Chile, Kinzer not only distorts facts but ignores them. 

Examining Allende 

My first point of critique is Kinzer’s lack of giving any extended background knowledge of Allende himself. Kinzer does indeed give a brief biographical look at Allende’s upbringing and beliefs, but, in my view, fails to dive deeper into Salvadore Allende’s less reputable connections. In his book The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB and the Battle for the Third World, author Vasili Mitrokhin, one of the KGB's most senior archivists turned defector in 1992, wrote in great detail about the KGB’s influence across third-world countries including Chile. In the book, he writes about how Salvadore Allende was a paid KGB informant in Chile. Mitrokhin wrote that Allende was “by far the most important of the KGB’s confidential contacts in South America.” Allende was contacted by the KGB in 1953, and in 1961 was reported to have stated, “his willingness to co-operate on a confidential basis and provide any necessary assistance, since he considered himself a friend of the Soviet Union. He willingly shared political information.” Later, in 1964, the Soviets established an embassy in Santiago which contained a KGB legal residency on Chilean soil. This fact was not touched on once in Kinzer’s chapter. While one could argue that he was only focusing on the American side of the ordeal, I would say that this is vitally important to make this point when discussing Allende. Kinzer condemns the

United State’s role in funding Eduardo Frei’s campaign throughout the 1960s but fails to mention that Allende and the Communist Party of Chile were being funded directly from Moscow. Mitrokhin writes, “Throughout the 1960s they (Allende’s party) were paid more than any other Communist Party in Latin America.” After his election, the KGB kept in regular contact with Allende and helped to influence many of his policies. This included establishing relations with both Chilean and Soviet intelligence agencies, an idea to which Allende reacted “positively”. During this time the KGB was also fully aware of the Two Tracks which Nixon and the “40 Committee” were working to enact. Given this information, the KGB was shown to have also been playing the same games as the CIA, but Kinzer only felt the need to focus solely on the United States’ role without mentioning the fact that Moscow had been involved with Chilean politics for nearly the same amount of time. In one section Kinzer seems to entirely sidestep important facts. Rather than writing about how Allende was a dyed-in-the-wool Marxist who had been backed by the KGB, he instead chose to dump Allende’s more extremist views as being the result of pleading workers and peasants. He is all too eager to reference the influence of corporations on American foreign policy, but the second the KGB pops its head up in the picture, he wants to attempt to shift the blame onto simple Chilean workers and farmers. 

In the chapter, very little was said about Allende’s dictatorial behavior during his time in office. In 1973, the Chilean Chamber of Deputies issued a resolution denouncing Allende for committing legal and constitutional violations. The resolution condemned Allende for illegally detaining and torturing journalists, shutting down opposition newspapers and radio stations, seeking to introduce Marxist indoctrination in schools which violated Chile’s educational rules, violently suppressing anti-Allende demonstrations, seeking to usurp judicial power, and violating constitutional property rights by seizing over 1,500 farms. Kinzer did not mention these acts once in his book. He did take time to mention the United States was funding right-wing extremist groups in Chile, but failed to mention Allende had also been encouraging socialist supporters to engage in acts of violence against those who would speak out against his regime. Allende was nothing short of acting as a dictator.

In the book, he does make mention of the attempted coup that took place in June of 1973. The coup was relatively unsuccessful but did provide an opportunity for Kinzer to show just how disliked Allende was. In his book, Mitrokhin writes that “The Santiago residency informed the Centre that it had obtained intelligence on plans for the coup and warned Allende.” Later he adds that the coup was not stopped due to previous planning on Allende’s part but to poor planning on the kidnappers' part. Mitrokhin states though that “The most significant aspect of the failed coup was the apathetic response to it by Chilean workers, the supposed bedrock of Allende’s support. Allende broadcast an appeal for ‘the people . . . to pour into the centre of the city’ to defend his government. They did not do so.” This event shows just how discontent the people of Chile were with Allende in the months prior to Pinochet’s eventual coup. To put it bluntly, his base did not care about him enough to defend him from kidnappers. Kinzer does not touch on this fact at all in his book. 

Invisible Blockade or Failed Economics? 

In the book, Kinzer discusses the CIA’s plan to wreak havoc on the Chilean economy after Allende became president. The plan involved two American foreign aid agencies not approving any new US assistance to Chile. Then the United States representative at the Inter-American Development Bank blocked all loans from being made to Chile. The president of the bank then degraded Chile’s credit rating from a B to a D, which led to private banks refusing to give loans to the nation. At the World Bank, the US suspended $21 million in livestock improvement and then opposed any new lending to Chile. This led to the cutting of aid, loans, and credit to Chile. In his words, President Nixon wanted to “Make the economy scream.” However, I believe Kinzer is placing far too much blame on the United States’ actions rather than on Allende’s economic policies themselves. Again Mitrokhin provides valuable insight into these matters. On the “Invisible Blockade” Mitrokhin wrote, “...Nixon gave instructions to ‘make the [Chilean] economy scream’, though in the event economic mismanagement by the Allende regime almost certainly did far more damage than the CIA.” Mitrokhin argues that the CIA’s actions, while indeed damaging the economy, were outdone by Allende’s failed economic policies. 

We should examine how much of an effect the “Invisible Blockade” had on the Chilean economy and whether or not it was as crippling as Kinzer makes it out to be. While yes, there was indeed a gradual reduction in financial aid given to Chile from the United States, there was not however a full turning off of the tap. In his book, Socialism, Economics and Development, Alec Nove, a socialist economist, argues that Chile’s economic problems did not

stem from a lack of financial aid created by the United States. Instead, “an important factor was the unfortunate and unpredictable fall in copper prices from their 1969 peak of $66 per tonto $48-9 per ton in 1971 and 1972… There was absolutely no evidence that the fall in prices was planned by anyone…” he later argues that while the United States cut off aid, loans, and credit, and while this did hinder Allende, and it was not the root cause of Chile’s ailing economy. He later goes onto say that Allende’s economic policies in 1971 were “a disaster.” (pg. 16) Although Kizner makes sure to note that corporations who were heavily involved in the copper industry were co-conspirators in the blockade, it seems odd that he does not make the point that copper prices decreased under Allende’s administration. This decrease in copper prices seems to perfectly coincide with the fact that before prices decreased, in July, Allende nationalized the major copper industries leading to copper prices falling. Kinzer does point out the major shortages seen in the Chilean economy. Products such as flour, razors, sugar, rice, potatoes, cigarettes, toilet paper, and toothpaste became scarce. This scarcity of basic goods was not due to the United States, however. This was due to Allende’s massive tariffs he imposed. The Cuban economist Carmelo Mesa-Lago in his book Market Socialists and Mixed Economies notes that the average tariff under Allende was 94%, with some tariffs being almost 600%. (pg. 32) What seemed to be the only blockade facing the Chilean economy was not coming from the United States but from Salvadore Allende himself.

Jake Kroesen graduated from the University of Central Missouri with a BS in Political Science and International Law. His writings have appeared in National Review and The Vital Center.